Do Indian regional parties influence foreign policy and under which conditions? Some foreign policy studies have shown that certain coalition-building configurations have facilitated the inclusion of the concerns of small parties in the foreign policy debate. Other works have looked at the role of decentralization and federal power-arrangement in providing more control to political sub-units over the external affairs of a state. Those separate scholarships provide interesting insights to account for the multi-level nature of coalition-building in a federal and pluralistic polity like India. Bridging these two literatures, I argue that the interdependence of regional and national coalition building processes (visible in federal settings) create locked-in alliances between national parties and regional parties which affect foreign policymaking. In these contexts, India's national parties have to, under certain conditions, take into account the preferences of regional parties when designing foreign policies. This article looks at the hypothesized causal mechanisms and expectations through two illustrative case studies of India's foreign policy.
It seems evident that some foreign policy decisions, such as signing trade deals, can disproportionately affect particular Indian regions. India's rural regions have for instance concerns about exposing their agricultural sectors to international competition. Similarly, India's coastal regions have longterm cultural and commercial connections with neighboring regions which they want to see acknowledged and protected through bilateral and multilateral trade deals. Yet, we still have no systematic understanding of when and how regional constituencies influence India's foreign policy decisions. In other words, can regional preferences shape India's foreign policy decisions at the center?
The distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the states was envisaged in the Indian Constitution (article 246) and emphasized that the Union government is competent to legislate in foreign affairs; diplomatic, consular and trade representation; participation in international conferences; entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementation of treaties, agreements, and conventions with foreign countries; foreign jurisdiction and trade and commerce with foreign countries. In spite of this apparent clear-cut division of competences, India's Union government has encountered over the last 25 years indirect and direct resistance from regional actors when trying to push foreign policies.
From 1989 to 2014 for example, India has been governed by various coalition government cabinets, but there has yet to be any systematic attempt to evaluate whether coalition governance has given space to regional preferences influencing India's external policies. For long, existing studies concentrated on the obstructive power of regional parties in border-states on India's policy toward neighboring countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. 1 Thereby, the question this article focuses on accounting for when and how exactly regional parties-which compete mainly in state legislatures-have an influence on foreign policy decisions.
Building on insights from the scholarship on the coalition politics of foreign policy-making and the study of regional and coalition politics in India, this article argues that the combination of regional parties' interest in specific foreign policy issues and the prevailing coalitional configuration in place (whether the national government is engaged in coalitional power-sharing arrangements with regional parties at the national and/or state-levels) determines the extent to which regional parties shape foreign policy decisions in India.
The remainder of the article of is organized in four sections. First, I identify and evaluate the relevance of existing scholarship(s) to account for the nature and extent of influence of regional parties and actors in the foreign policy decision-making process. Second, I suggest a new argument combining insights from recent works on coalition building and arrangements in the Indian context. In the third part, I probe the relevance of this approach in two case-studies to see whether and how regional political interests influenced Indian foreign policy making. Finally, the article concludes with some discussion of the findings and future research directions.
The neglected role of regional parties For decades, most international relations theories assumed that national elections are decided on the basis of domestic policies, thereby leaving leaders with much latitude when making foreign policy decisions. Many scholars thus concluded that a governmental elite has exclusive control over foreign policy to efficiently protect the national interest. 2 For instance, India's foreign policy decision-making structure was long considered as a restricted decision unit to the Prime minister, Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of External Affairs, all positions controlled by one party. 3 However, scholarship has increasingly looked at the politicization of foreign policy-making in democratic settings. Some studies have shown that varying domestic institutional conditionsincluding whether countries have presidential or parliamentary systems, autonomous or constrained executives, and open or closed institutionsenable or constrain the influence of parties in shaping foreign policies. 4 Within this scholarship, the literature on the role of multiparty coalition governments in foreign policy-making is of particular interest for this study. Building on arguments from institutionalist theory (the role of veto players) and social psychology (group-level bargaining dynamics), scholars have demonstrated how coalition politics have both led to foreign policy compromises but also to radical foreign policy departures, as well as decision postponement, and non-decisions. 5 Attention has therefore been given to factors explaining variation in foreign policy outcomes between different types of coalition governments. 6 Some scholars notably demonstrated that coalition-building configurations facilitate the inclusion of concerns of small parties in foreign policy decisions. 7 For instance, small parties can threaten through blackmailing tactics to withdraw their support (and possibly to defect from the coalition) to disproportionately shape foreign policy. Alternatively, the major parties can use foreign policy decisions to mobilize and divert attention from the apparent electoral weakness of their coalition governments, thereby rallying the support of smaller parties.
However, the empirical cases from which these theories are derived are predominantly West European coalition governments. 8 As a result, the focus of these parties (and the input of small parties' ideas) lies on party competition along the traditional left-right ideological spectrum, overlooking the role of regional-level issues and disagreements. 9 This conceptualization and measurement of ideological differences within coalitions is not suitable to account for the cross-cutting political and social cleavages typical to a federal and multicultural polity like India.
Another scholarship has studied the influence of political decentralization of political power and federal arrangements on foreign policy-making, and notably increasing role of political sub-units within various federal systems over the external affairs of a state. According to this literature on paradiplomacy, some regions, states, provinces, and cities have managed to develop their own external relations when constitutional arrangements accommodate some power-sharing possibilities and/or remain ambiguous over the distribution of competences over foreign policy. 10 One major insight coming from this literature is the identification of small spatially concentrated constituencies that can hold informed and committed preferencesoften expressed through the intermediary of regional partiesover specific foreign policy issues. However, these studies mainly explain under which institutional conditions such as subnational governance structures may develop their own transnational networks with other similar sub-units in other countries. The focus is therefore more on the separation of power among layers of governance and less on situations under which local preferences directly conflict with national positions.
Multi-level coalitions and managed foreign policy-making
To address some of the conceptual and empirical limitations mentioned above, this article explores the ways in which and the extent to which regional partiesparties which compete mainly in regional legislatures-can influence foreign policy decisions in India. This article suggests to concentrate on the agential and structural patterns of political bargaining in multi-party coalitions in a federal democracy like India. I operationalize the dependent variable-influence on state foreign policy-as the concessions made by a large nation-wide party (thereby NWP) forming and leading the governing coalition, 11 to a regional party on a foreign policy decision. Regional parties are understood as parties mainly competing in state-level elections (competing in one state). I also distinguish substantial foreign policy concessions-direct input on the nature the foreign policy issue-from "side-payments"concessions that are not directly related to the substance of the foreign policy decision, such as promises of policy benefits for state parties' local constituencies or of electoral support at the state legislature level.
I look at two explanatory factors: regional salience of foreign policy issues and coalitional configuration. Regional salience of foreign policy issues is defined as small but spatially concentrated constituencies that hold informed and committed preferences over time (through the intermediary of regional parties) on specific foreign policy issues. 12 The variation in regional preferences can be observed through the geographical distribution and concentration of specific interests relative to foreign policy issues. For instance, the Tamil parties have held consistent and enduring preferences over India's relationship with Sri Lanka, notably over the welfare of the Tamil minority. Similarly, the process of liberalization initiated in the early 1990s has gradually given greater leverage to Indian states in the country's foreign economic policy. 13 Since states have now carried out direct economic negotiations with external entities, they have developed economic interests and stakes in particular regions. 14 However, I also argue that strong regional salience on a foreign policy issue is not a sufficient condition to observe regional influence on foreign policy. Strong foreign policy preferences and opposition from state parties only lead to a reaction from the Union government if these disagreements are likely to bring electoral costs. Narang and Staniland recently argued that the shifting electoral salience of foreign policy issues and the clarity of responsibility for policy outcomes combined in various ways to generate different accountability environments in which Indian politicians operate. 15 In accordance with this, I argue that small but regionally concentrated parties can pressure the national leadership and thereby influence foreign policy decisions through what I call coalitional pressure.
Here I build from the extensive scholarship on the effects of India's experience with coalitions on its domestic politics. While the Indian case is often cited as evidence to support the claim that coalition politics have a decisive impact on foreign policy decisions, 16 there has been no systematic inquiry of the effects of India's transition to a coalition style of governance on its external policies. 17 By contrast, there is an important scholarship on the institutional and political reasons that gave rise to political coalitions at the national level, the size of political coalitions in India, the increasing influence of (mostly regional) parties at the national level within large coalitions, the gradual learning process of coalition-making andsustaining, and to some extent the impact on policy outputs. 18 An important insight from this literature has been the growing influence at the national level of a multitude of regional-and state-level political parties which have virtually performed as kingmakers in the tenuous coalition governments that were formed at the national level from 1989 to 2014. 19 The two largest NWPs, the Indian National Congress (INC) and since 1998 the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have had to build large executive and/or legislative coalitions which included many of these smaller parties. In the Indian context, an executive coalition is limited to the parties directly allied and present in government while a legislative coalition is a broader alliance with external supporters that have committed to a pre-electoral powersharing arrangement but have decided to opt out of government participation. This legislative coalition is also further cemented if the NWP has also established electoral alliances at the state-level with regional/local parties. In effect, this creates "mutual electoral interdependencies" between the NWP and smaller parties, making it difficult for either of them to withdraw backing without running the risk of losing their electoral support in national-or state-level assembly polls. 20 Therefore coalition building arrangements following both national and regional elections (visible in federal settings) create locked-in alliances between NWPs and regional parties. 21 Unlike traditional West European cases of intra-coalitional bargaining, it is important in the Indian context to not exclusively concentrate on the number of seats in parliament for each party present in cabinet but to also look at the number of seats held by external supporters as well as electoral arrangements negotiated at the state level with regional parties. Coalitions are not only formed in national parliaments but also within state legislatures, creating multi-level coalitions, thereby making it necessary for national parties to take into account the concerns of a wider number of electoral partners when designing policies, and under some conditions, foreign policies.
Building on these assumptions, I expect four possible outcomes resulting from different combinations of regional preference and coalitional configuration:
• I: In the absence of strong regional salience of foreign policy issues and of coalitional pressure, the NWP leading the governing coalition does not make policy concessions to the regional party. • II: the coalitional arrangement does not create any imminent pressure but regional salience of a foreign policy issue (and the perspective of future elections at the national-or state-level) encourage the NWP leading the governing coalition to make limited concessions to accommodate existing concerns from the regional party. • III: The coalitional pressure and the absence of regional salience of the foreign policy issue open the possibility of logrolling, a situation in which a quid pro quo arrangement is proposed by the NWP leading the governing coalition to guarantee the support in the national parliament of the regional party in exchange for side-payments (concessions which are unrelated to the foreign policy debate). 22 • IV: Both regional salience and coalitional pressure lead the NWP leading the governing coalition to make substantial foreign policy concessions to accommodate regional party concerns.
In the following section, I probe the relevance of these hypothesized dynamics in the context of two Indian foreign policy decisions: India's Sri Lanka votes at the United Nations Human Right Council (UNHRC) in 2012-2013 and India's decision to sign a nuclear deal with the US in 2008. These cases are selected based on two different combinations of the two variables (coalitional pressure and regional salience). I also use processtracing to unpack the precise structural and agential patterns of political bargaining to explain the specific foreign policy outcomes. 23 India's Sri Lanka votes at the UNHCR (2012-2013)
The welfare of the neighboring Indian-origin Tamil population in Sri Lanka in the context of the rise of Sinhalese linguistic nationalism has been a salient issue since the 1970s for the two major regional parties competing for the control of the legislative assembly in Tamil Nadu, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). As a result, this issue has influenced much of the intra-coalition discussions between the Center and regional parties. For decades, the singleparty majority of the INC limited any possible pressure from the Tamil parties on India's Sri Lanka policy but the growing need for support of the Tamil parties after 1989 to form national coalitions have led Indian NWPs to increasingly take into account regional inputs.
The combination of regional salience and coalitional pressure influenced the INC-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition which was reelected into power in May 2009. The DMK was both a member of the ruling UPA with 16 seats in the national parliament and had a majority in the state legislative. Its leader and Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, Karunanidhi, pressed the UPA to demand a ceasefire in Sri Lanka and threatened to review his party's support for the coalition if India did not adopt a more interventionist foreign policy. 24 Under pressure, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh summoned the Sri Lankan High Commissioner to express India's concerns. The Indian government also asked for the suspension of hostilities to encourage a political resolution to Sri Lanka's ethnic problem. However, the coalitional configuration and electoral timeline favored the national coalition cabinet in 2009. While the INC-led coalition had just been reelected thanks to the decisive support of the DMK, the DMK-led government in the state Tamil Nadu was already anticipating the need for electoral support in the upcoming state elections of 2011. As a result, despite a strong regional salience, the INC-led coalition toned down its rhetoric against Sri Lanka. 25 The situation evolved in 2012. The DMK lost the elections in the regional legislature in 2011 and its relations with the INC deteriorated. By that time, a US-backed resolution was brought to the vote at the UNHCR in 2012 to condemn the violations of human rights by the Sri Lankan government against the Tamil minorities. This time however, the coalitional pressure from the DMK forced the central government to vote against Sri Lanka. To placate DMK concerns, the Indian government chose to break with its traditional practice of not voting for country-specific motions, especially with regards to interference in domestic politics. Concerned about its relations with the Rajapaksa government in Colombo which was also getting closer to China, the central government suggested two modifications in the resolution, effectively qualifying its support, especially by proposing that the Sri Lankan government give its prior approval to international inspections. This compromise solution failed however to compel the Sri Lankan government to change its behavior and did not ease the concerns of the DMK.
The U.S. sponsored a stronger UNHCR resolution in 2013 and the DMK demanded this time that the INC-led government amend the resolution to explicitly condemn Colombo of genocide and war crimes. The DMK was pressured to act by its local rival, the AIDMK, which passed a resolution in the state assembly urging the Indian government to stop treating Sri Lanka as a friendly country. A series of UPA ministers condemned Sri Lanka's treatment of the Tamil population and India voted in favor of the resolution.
However, the concessions from the INC failed to satisfy DMK which chose to follow up on its threats and withdrew from the UPA coalition in March 2013 over the Sri Lanka issue without leading to the fall of the UPA alliance. The DMK stayed in the broader legislative coalition and its support remained essential for the coalition government's survival. 26 The coalitional configuration therefore forced the Indian government to continue to make concessions when voting at the UNHCR. There were further concessions such as the decision of Prime Minister Singh to skip the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and to send the External Affairs Minister in his stead to publicly signal India's protest against Sri Lanka's treatment of its Tamil community. The UNHCR votes and the non-visit to Colombo further deteriorated India's relations with the Rajapaksa-led Sri Lanka government to the advantage of China.
This first case seems to confirm both outcomes II and IV at two different time periods. In 2009, the INC was initially dependent on the support from the DMK in the elections and to form a coalition, which pressured it to make concessions in its policy toward Sri Lanka. Strong and long-term regional salience and coalitional pressure initially led to outcome IV and policy concessions. However, as the UPA grew weaker at the national level by losing various regional party allies like West Bengal's Trinamool Congress, the INC did attempt to placate DMK concerns and voted to condemn Sri Lanka in 2012 and 2013 at the UNHCR. In this context, regional interests seemed to have partly trumped geopolitical concerns as India's sanction votes initially enabled China to increase its political influence in Sri Lanka. Contrasting with geopolitical and normative predictions, or even with the narrative that bottom-up pressures from the Tamil Nadu political parties lead national government to systematically condemn Sri Lanka, a closer look at the various coalitional configurations and the interplay with Tamil politics tells us a more nuanced account of India's evolving position at the UNHRC from 2009 to 2013.
The India-US nuclear deal
In this section, I look at the impact of coalitional and regional politics on the nuclear agreement negotiations with the U.S. from 2005 to 2008. This period corresponded to a situation of high coalitional pressure as the INC-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) minority coalition government depended on the external support from the Left Front (composed of four Left national parties seating in parliament). While in opposition, the INC and the Left parties were concerned about the renunciation of Indian foreign policy autonomy in the context of a rapprochement with the U.S. 27 Nevertheless, the UPA coalition resumed nuclear negotiations with the George W. Bush administration which had been initiated under the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government.
On July 18, 2005, the two countries announced an Indo-US nuclear deal which was to be the most wide-ranging partnership in the history of their bilateral relations. 28 In the statement, the US declared itself ready to change domestic laws and policies and to work with international partners to equally reform the existing international regulations to allow sale to India of nuclear material and reactors for civilian purposes. The US administration freed the relationship from the nuclear stalemate, which mainly was grounded in India's refusal to sign the NPT and the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 which barred India from getting any kind of sensitive, high technology assistance.
The expansive language of the 2005 agreement was framed in Delhi as a type of confidence-building measure to mobilize support beyond the INC, to obtain the support from the general population and its coalition allies. The Indian government argued that the nuclear deal would satisfy the rising needs, as nuclear energy only made up for around 3% of India's energy needs and was announced to reach 10% in the medium term. 29 The problem was that the indigenous reserves of uranium were insufficient to support the development of India's nuclear program as some reactors (Tarapur 1 and 2) could not be operated without the provision of imported enriched uranium. 30 The nuclear deal was therefore presented as a means to facilitate the resumption of uranium imports which had been curtailed by the sanctions which had followed the 1974 nuclear test. To garner support for the nuclear program, the INC presented the nuclear deal as an instrument to reinforce India's energy security, economic self-sufficiency and strategic autonomy.
At the time, the Left Front, which was part of the broader legislative coalition through its external support, expressed concerns that the rapprochement with the U.S. could compromise India's strategic autonomy. The UPA's external supporters in parliament were alarmed that a rapprochement with the US would damage India's relations with Iran. For instance, India supported in September 2005 and February 2006 two US-led resolutions passed at the IAEA which censured Iran's nuclear program. The Indian vote, which happened shortly after the announcement of negotiations for the Indo-US nuclear deal, was considered by the Left parties as an Indian "sellout" to US pressure in order to consolidate the emerging partnership with Washington. 31 It was also reported in India that the U.S. Congress had specifically asked for "reciprocity" and for an explicit Indian support on the Iran nuclear question. 32 Similarly, the dismissal in February 2006 of Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar, considered to be too supportive of the pipeline project with Iran, was equally considered to be a concession to the US. 33 A member of the Left Front, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)), judged that the debate was not about a nuclear deal but about a "wider strategic alliance" with the U.S. 34 It therefore argued that the deal would compromise India's strategic autonomy. 35 These divisions, mainly between the INC and the Left Front, led to a debate in the parliament over the approval of the nuclear deal. According to the Indian constitution, the Indian government does not need parliamentary approval to enter into international agreements or to sign treaties. However, the INC coalition government was dependent on allies outside its coalition such as the Left Front and had negotiated with them a common minimum program before the 2004 elections. The Communist parties of the Left Front were disappointed with the INC's attempts to centralize the decision-making process when it came to US policy, and by the fact there was originally no consultation. 36 While the INC's decision to not consult its allies was justified from an institutional standpoint (as there was no need for parliamentary approval), it was not adapted to the situation of coalition politics where numerically small partiers hold greater bargaining power and influence on foreign policy making.
In spite of regular reassurances from the government that India's national "autonomy of decision-making" would be preserved during the negotiations with the US, the Left Front finally withdrew its support in July 2008 and a no-confidence vote in Parliament became inevitable. 37 After the withdrawal of Left Front's support, the Congress needed 43 votes to win a confidence vote and struck deals with specific regional parties. Some regional parties seized the opportunity to formulate specific claims in exchange for their support. For instance, the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) demanded the creation of a separate federal state of Telengana (carved out of the state of Andhra Pradesh) in exchange for its vote. 38 Another regional party, the Samajwadi Party (SP), negotiated a seat-sharing agreement in Uttar Pradesh with the Congress for the next general parliamentary elections. 39 The deal was ultimately approved by the Indian parliament, but only after difficult negotiations and a no-confidence vote that the government survived with considerable difficulty, thanks mainly to the support of 37 SP members of parliament (275 in favor, 256 against). 40 The debate leading to the signing of the nuclear agreement in 2008 confirms the expectations of outcome III. Coalitional pressure was strong but the INC was in a situation to engage into logrolling with a regional party like the SP given the low regional salience of the nuclear issue.
Conclusions
The article argued that India's foreign policy decisions can be influenced by regional parties in federal and multi-party settings depending on the coalitional arrangement and the existence (or absence) of expressed and long-term regional preferences. As discussed above, the two case-studies in this paper seem to confirm the structural expectations of the argument that variations in regional salience and coalitional pressure lead to foreign policy concessions or logrolling. However, one additional finding of the article is also that the agency and strategies of the NWPs which build and manage coalitions at the national and regional levels matter because these NWPs can learn overtime how to deal with internal coalition disputes to mobilize and push their foreign policy agenda. This also highlight the fact the existence in India of multi-party coalitions does not mean these cabinets are particularly weak and hostage to blackmailing or vetoes from junior party members on foreign policy issues. In fact, under certain coalitional configurations and varying regional interest in foreign policy issues, the NWP has strong leverage. There was for instance no hijacking or decisive veto power from the external supporters of the UPA coalition during the Indo-US nuclear deal debate.
One possible conclusion from this study however is that the fact that some regional parties can be recruited in a coalition on an ad hoc basis if there is low regional salience (in exchange for electoral support at the state-level). This managed foreign policy strategy can prevent the emergence of an explicit grand strategic direction. Building from the second case, it is for instance not clear that a regional party like the SP has become a long-term stakeholder of the foreign policy decision it supported. The 2008 debate could lead future NWPs to try to improve intra-coalition consultation and consensus-building over these matters. To some degree, some recent policy and institutional changes have been heading in that direction. Central coalition governments have increasingly tried to informally involve Chief Ministers through invitations to summits and bilateral visits in order to coordinate, if not preempt, the formation of parallel diplomatic channels (Wyatt 2017). At the formal level, the Indian government has also decided to create a "States Division" within the Ministry of External Affairs as an effort to coordinate center-states foreign policy interests. 41 Future studies should look beyond these two illustrative case studies to further test and refine the interactive and causal effects of regional salience and coalitional arrangements in other Indian cases during the 1989-2014 period of coalition governance. For the broader foreign policy analysis scholarship, this study also suggests new causal mechanisms to understand when and how regionally concentrated constituencies can influence the central government's foreign policy decisions and which could be examined in other federal democratic systems of government.
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